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LEADERSHIP AND MAJORITARIANISM: 
A RESPONSE 
Barry Friedman* 
In Dialogue and Judicial Review1 I sought to replace the pre-
vailing description of the role of judicial review-that of the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty" -with a description that more 
accurately portrays the role constitutional courts play in Ameri-
can society. In the context of the "countermajoritarian diffi-
culty," courts are seen as aloof from society, occasionally 
trumping the will of political majorities. I suggested that to the 
extent majoritarianism is a meaningful concept, courts are no less 
majoritarian than other branches of government. But I also rec-
ognized that the idea of majoritarianism is, as a description of 
any part of our political process, including courts, extremely 
problematic. Finally, I redescribed the process of constitutional 
decisionmaking as a dialogue among numerous elements of soci-
ety. In that dialogue courts speak to the issues, but they also 
facilitate and tend the dialogue. 
In their comment on my article, Professors Solimine and 
Walker disagree with certain aspects of my approach. Primarily, 
they find flawed to a certain extent my reliance on polling data to 
support my argument that the Supreme Court is no less 
majoritarian than other branches of government.z The area of 
disagreement between us may not be great, however, for 
Solimine and Walker "agree with [my] broad conclusions."3 Uti-
mately they conclude "[m]ajoritarianism is not a dichotomous va-
riable, but is instead continuous."4 Then Solimine and Walker 
move from the descriptive to the normative, arguing: "It is dan-
gerous for any branch, elected or not, to be too majoritarian."s 
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. 
1. Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993). 
2. Michael E. Solimine and James L. Walker, The Supreme Court, Judicial Review, 
and the Public: Leadership Versus Dialogue, 11 Const. Comm. 1, 2-3 (1993). 
3. ld. at 5. 
4. ld. Indeed, we probably do not disagree at all. Fully one-third of my article is 
devoted to demonstrating the bankrupt nature of the entire dichotomous approach to 
majoritarianism. 
5. ld. 
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Finally, they express the fear that "the public in the future will 
demand an even more majoritarian Court, perhaps to our deep 
regret."6 
In their shift from the descriptive to the normative Solimine 
and Walker reveal a paradox that perhaps colors all our thinking 
regarding judicial review. Solimine and Walker believe no 
branch should be too majoritarian because government is sup-
posed to provide leadership, and leadership is inconsistent with 
the idea of majority rule.7 Similarly, a blind adherence to majori-
tarianism will lead to the tyranny of the majority, a state of af-
fairs no one, from the framing to the present, has argued is 
entirely desirable.s 
The paradox is that majoritarianism is inconsistent with 
leadership, but most of us seem to want both out of government, 
including the judiciary. This paradox was quite evident in the last 
presidential election, particularly with regard to the campaign of 
Citizen Perot. Ostensibly, Perot's campaign was a populist, grass 
roots campaign. Its appeal rested in returning government to the 
people. According to Perot and his adherents, government was 
off on some tangent of its own, instead of listening to the folks 
that paid the bills. But reality diverged from rhetoric in the Perot 
campaign, as Perot's detractors made clear. Perot's campaign, 
though ostensibly grass roots, apparently was funded and run 
from one focus: Perot himself. To some Perot seemed the auto-
cratic despot, who would bully the country into following his 
edicts to the peril of our balanced system of government. 
The paradox of Perot's campaign is that despite Perot's fol-
lowers' desire for returning government to the people, Perot's 
autocratic nature was probably as much a selling point to them as 
it was a negative to his detractors. Just as much of the criticism 
of George Bush and the Congress was that they were doing little 
to move the country in any direction, much of Perot's appeal 
seemed to be that he was a "take charge" sort of person who 
would pursue strong policies to cure the country's ills. In short, 
for all the rhetoric about returning government to the people, 
what the Perot candidacy really seemed to be about was a desire 
for leadership in government. When Perot supporters talked 
about returning government to the people, they really meant to 
tum government over to their chosen leader. 
6. Id. at 6. 
7. Id. at 5. 
8. ld. 
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The paradox was not confined to Perot's campaign, how-
ever: it was present in reverse in the other candidates' campaigns. 
In the eyes of many, the 1992 presidential election campaign was 
about leadership. Thus, candidates Bush and Clinton tried to 
present themselves as leaders. Meanwhile, their pollsters-as is 
common in our latter-twentieth century politics-worked hard to 
keep their hand on the pulse of the American people. Why? So 
their candidates would know what policies, as "leaders," they 
ought to suggest. Perot aside, the election was an exercise in 
"leaders" asking what the public wanted so they could appear to 
be leading. 
This same paradox infects our attempt to understand the 
role of judicial review.9 Nowhere is this more evident than in 
Alexander Bickel's The Least Dangerous Branch, the work that 
more than any other brought to the fore the problem of the 
"countermajoritarian difficulty."w In The Least Dangerous 
Branch, Bickel began with his fundamental point: how to explain 
the role of courts in a government that calls itself a democracy? 
Courts are neither elected by nor beholden to the people.u Yet 
Bickel resolved the problem by assigning to courts the most 
countermajoritarian view of courts imaginable: according to 
Bickel, given their insulation from the body politic, courts should 
be opinion leaders and prophets regarding constitutional 
norms.tz 
Solimine and Walker offer a view of judicial review similar 
to Bickel's. After suggesting that I make too much of data that 
shows public support for many Supreme Court decisions, and 
public support generally for the Court, Solimine and Walker of-
fer a "restatement" of the problem.tJ Although they recognize 
that, at least "over generations, the Court is as majoritarian as 
any other branch of government is, or ought to be,"t4 they argue 
that no branch, including the courts, should be too 
majoritarian.t5 Why? "One of the functions of leadership is to 
create new majorities and the Court has a leadership role as im-
portant as that of any other branch of government, as measured 
by public support and acceptance (or acquiescence) in its deci-
9. I take no credit for this idea, but merely for its present formulation. For a partic-
ularly eloquent statement of the tension in our views regarding judicial review see Louis 
Michael Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 So. Cal. L. Rev. 1571 (1988). 
10. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). 
11. ld. at 16-17. 
12. Id. at 239. 
13. Solimine and Walker, 11 Const. Comm. at 5 (cited in note 2). 
14. ld. 
15. ld. 
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sions. "16 They have thus at least partially returned to Bickel's 
identificaion of and solution to the countermajoritarian paradox. 
In Dialogue and Judicial Review my approach was to tackle 
the paradox by returning the discussion of judicial review from 
the normative to the descriptive. Normative visions of judicial 
review had, in my mind, all failed to the extent that they began 
from the premises of the countermajoritarian difficulty. The 
countermajoritarian difficulty is deeply flawed as a descriptive 
matter, in part for many reasons that form the backdrop for this 
dialogue between me and Professors Solimine and Walker. As 
an alternative, I offered a description of courts as facilitating and 
speaking in a society-wide dialogue about the meaning of the 
Constitution. 
As I describe at length in Dialogue and Judicial Review, the 
answer to the paradox rests in the inherent workings of our con-
stitutional system, which constantly moves all branches in and 
out of line with public opinion. For the elected branches this cy-
cle is regular and apparent, enforced by regular elections. 
Whether we elect people that do reflect our views, or elect repre-
sentatives who work hard around election time to make it appear 
that they reflect our views, the fact is that periodic alignments 
can and do occur with regard to the elected branches. Thus, at 
times politicians, whether they are leading are not, may drift 
away from public opinion, but elections determine whether the 
leadership meets with our approval. 
Despite the fact that judges are not elected, and do not serve 
for fixed terms, there also is an opportunity for periodic align-
ment of the judiciary with the views of the public. That align-
ment occurs in part, though not exclusively, through the process 
of presidential appointment and Senate confirmation. As 
Solimine and Walker recognize, "there are indirect mechanisms 
[for linking the public to the Court] ... such as the appointment 
of Justices by like-minded Presidents."11 
What is evident, however, is that unlike the regular cycle of 
popular elections, whatever the basis for aligning the courts with 
the public, it is far less certain and regular than for the elected 
branches. Thus, the cycling that occurs between public and judi-
ciary is subject to much broader sweeps and longer terms. There 
are going to be times, such as prior to President Roosevelt's 
16. ld. 
17. ld. at 4. 
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Court-packing plan, when the Court gets very far out of line with 
public opinion,ts 
Yet, it is this very broad cycling that helps in part to resolve 
the paradox, for it turns out that the judiciary can and will be 
both majoritarian and countermajoritarian. There will be times 
when the Supreme Court is very much in line with public opin-
ion; indeed, we may be living through one of them. But just as 
the courts will sometimes fall into step with public opinion, and 
sometimes fall behind it, they also will fall in front of it. There 
will be times when the courts do lead public opinion. The War-
ren Court is an example, though perhaps it taught us the limits of 
judicial leadership. 
The intriguing area for further inquiry that this understand-
ing opens up involves determining the best balance between 
leadership and majoritarianism, and how the swings in cycles can 
be moderated if that is appropriate. Solimine and Walker surely 
are correct that we wish some leadership from the Supreme 
Court, just as they are correct that too much majoritarianism can 
be a bad thing. But by the same token, too much leadership may 
be no different than no leadership at all, for if Dred Scott taught 
us anything, it is that a public deeply disenchanted with judicial 
decisionmaking will look for other solutions. 
18. See generally Daniel A. Farber, William N. Eskridge, Jr., and Philip P. Frickey, 
Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law: Themes for the Constitution's Third Century 
809-10 (West Pub. Co., 1993). 
